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SOME IDEAS FOR MAKING THE COMMUNITY WORK BETTER 
The institutional arrangements of the European 
Connnunity are necessarily very different from those with 
which we are familiar at national level, and particularly 
from those which are appropriate for a unitary and fairly 
centralized State such as the United Kingdom. A 
Connnunity of nine (and soon ten) indeoendent nation 
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states requires a more complex system of checks and 
balances between the various institutions which play a 
part in its decision-making process. 
In such a system decisions may often take longer 
than we might wish but it is clearly more important to 
reach the right decisions attracting the maxinrum degree 
of support and consensus, than to cut corners and use 
procedures which create dissatisfaction and distrust. 
During the two decades throughout which the institutions 
set up under the Treaties have operated a great deal 
has been achieved and the foresight of those who drew 
up the Treaties has been proved by experience. 
Nonetheless ./. 
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Nonetheless it is natural that after more 
than two decades during which the world has 
changed dramatically we should re-examine the 
structures of the Community to determine what 
adaptations or changes may be required to deal 
with new circumstances. During the last 5 years 
there have been several significant new developments 
which have created new pressures on or raised new 
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questions about how the Conrrnunity works. 'lllere 
has been the setting up of the European Council 
as a thrice yearly meeting of leaders of all 
Member States which, though outside the arrangements 
set up under the Treaties, has assumed considerable 
importance in Conrrnunity affairs. 'llle long-awaited 
direct elections to the European Parliament have 
taken place, and that institution now speaks with 
greater self-confidence and greater moral authority 
than before. The finances of the Community have 
reached a stage where a fundamental reassessment 
of priorities must take place. And finally there 
is the forthcoming enlargement of the Community, 
to ten next year and later to 12 Member States, 
which makes it even more important that we should 
immediately tackle any shortcomings in the present 
Community arrangements. 
THE COUNCIL ./. 
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THE COUNCIL 
Let me turn first to the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers. The main problem here 
seems to me to be the lack of coherence between the 
policies and decisions of the various Councils, a 
problem which I sought to highlight in a speech to 
the European Parliament recently when I referred to 
the opening up of new perspectives by European 
Councils under t~e __ ar~_li2hts of media attention, 
and the subsequent closing down of these perspectives 
by Budget Ministers in the watches of the night. Far 
too often the high-sounding declarations of Community 
leaders gathered in the European Council to discuss 
energy, employment, or the Third World are not given 
any follow-up or translated into substantive action 
by the Community when the time comes for the Council 
to take decisions. 
This problem of a lack of consistency is just 
as glaring when one considers the Council of Ministers 
in all its various forms. Let me give an example from 
the field with which I am most familiar - that 
relating to the Budget. Several Councils are 
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involved here - in particular the annual joint 
Council of Finance and Foreign Affairs Ministers 
which discusses the economic framework, the Budget 
Council which takes the detailed decisions on amounts 
put in the Budget, and the Agriculture Council which 
reaches the annual agricultural price settlement -
which of course has wide implications for the 
Connnunity Budget. 
We have all too often seen the Joint Council 
express the view that there is a need both for 
economies in Community expenditure (in order to keep 
within the 1% VAT ceiling) and for a better balance 
in the Connnunity Budget between agricultural and 
non-agricultural expenditure. The Budget Council, 
which effectively deals only with the non-agricultural 
expenditure, has then made sharp cuts in the Corrnnission's 
proposals. lhe Agriculture Council however has continued 
to proceed on the basis of trade-offs between national 
agricultural objectives rather than within an 
overall financial or indeed CAP framework, and as 
a result produced settlements which pushed up the 
total of agricultural expenditure. The combined 
result of these activities and decisions has been 
to produce few real economies and to shift the balance 
of the budget further towards agriculture - which 
is precisely the opposite of what has been agreed in the 
first place as the objective. 
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The resolution of this problem, like that 
of many others which the Community faces, does 
not necessarily require major institutional change. 
What is required, I believe, is the establishment 
of a much clearer policy link between the decisions 
of the various Councils and greater use of the 
Parliament as a forum where those who take the 
decisions are required to explain themselves in 
In the case of the Budget this would mean 
carrying out three reforms. First, Finance Ministers 
should meet before the agricultural prices settlement 
and the beginning of the budget procedure for a thorough 
discussion of economic and budgetary policy. They should 
lay down clear public guidelines for decisions to be 
taken by Agriculture and Budget Ministers - in agriculture 
this could be for example the maximum percentage increase 
in costs, the necessary limitation on the inflationary 
effects of food cost increases etc. Secondly, after 
the prices settlement the President in Office of the 
Agriculture Council and th~ responsible Corrnrtissioner 
should report to and be publicly questioned by the 
European Parliament. The Parliament would wish to know 
whether they agreed on their assessment of the 
settlement and if not, why not. The essential 
point is that the settlement would be assessed as a whole 
and in a Community context and not simply as at 
present in terms of the various individual national 
agricultural interests. Thirdly, the budget ye.1.r 
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and the agriculture year should be brought more closely 
into line with each other so that agriculture would 
cease automatically to pre-empt resources which the 
Budget authority might otherwise wish to apply to 
regional, social, industrial or other policies. 
If the two procedures ran in closer parallel 
the budget could more e.asily be seen as an integrated 
whole. 
These three reforms, relatively simple to 
implement, could, I believe, have a significant 
effect in establishing a more consistent budget 
strategy, in pr~serving and improving the Common 
Agricultural Policy, and in furthering harmonious 
relations between the Community institutions. The 
key to their implementation lies in a recognition of 
the need and assertion of political will by Community 
leaders. 
THE PARLIAMENT 
The budgetary pow,3rs of the Parliament, as 
one part of the Community's Budgetary Authority, 
are central to its institutional role. Without a 
real dialogue between Council and Parliament ou the 
Budget there is unlikely to be any real dialogue at 
~11. The procedure is designed as one in which 
each institution makes a contribution, and where 
differences can be resolved by a degree of give-and-take. 
If the procedure is treated with cynicism and its 
complexities are exploited to prevent one of the 
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institutions from playing its appropriate role the 
whole spirit of the institutional relationships 
is violated and the prospect of effective decision-
making is undermined. 
1here is, I think, a particular onus on the 
Council to seek to improve the dialogue with the 
Parliament and to make it effective rather than 
cosmetic. Parliament, as the newer and still more 
junior partner, is naturally jealous of its powers 
and anxious to test their limits. But I would 
suggest that the best way for Parliament to make 
its presence felt and to impress its electors is 
to exploit more effectively the powers it already 
has. Frankly I am not convinced that this has 
been done sufficiently so far. 
One of the most important powers of any 
democratic assembly is the power publicly to ask 
questions and demand answers, to call to account 
those who take decisions and those who administer 
them. This requires detailed, perhaps boring, 
preparation and follow-up, and procedures which 
allow an issue to be exposed rather than evaded. 
Plenary sessions ./. 
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Plenary Sessions of the Parliament provide 
only limited opportunities for such an approach 
especially since Question Time seems to have been 
down-graded, covers questions very slowly, and 
tends to be monopolized by MEPs of one nationality, 
often asking constituency questions. The Connnittees, 
which offer much wider scope for calling Ministers 
and Connnissioners to account by persistent, skilful, 
' and well-informed- questioning genera11y meet in 
private. As someone who recognises the importance 
of a democratic element in the institutional 
arrangements of the Connnunity and wants to see 
a strong and successful European Parliament (even 
though it will probably make my own life more 
difficult) I do find this a surprising approach. 
I should have thought that the Connnunity already 
had an adequate number of connnittees meeting in 
private and that the particular contribution which 
the Parliament can make is to introduce a degree of 
public accountability - drawing, for example, on 
some of the procedures of U.S. Congressional 
Committees. 
If the Parliament ./. 
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It is right that the European Parliament should 
not confine itself to areas where it has powers. 
Members naturally wish to express themselves on a 
wide range of important and topical issues. But if 
MEPs show more interest in turning up for set-piece 
declamatory debates than for occasions when the 
Parliament has a real Community role and a degree 
of actual power they will not succeed in carrying 
as much weight as they should. It is for examole 
extraordinary that the annual debate on the budget 
discharge, which is one of the three major powers 
of the European Parliament, this year attracted only 
a handful of MEPs and lasted a very short time. 
Attendance is also important. Mr Tindemans, 
to whom we have just listened with interst, is I 
fear one of the few ou·t of several important 
figures elected to the Parliament who takes the 
trouble to attend regularly. Perhaps I may also 
take the opportunity to compliment the British 
MEPs for their exceptionally diligent attendance 
on all Parliamentary occasions, which has I know 
impressed many of their colleagues from other 
Member States. 
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THE COMMISSION 
The Report of the "Three Wise Men" on the 
Cormnunity institutions said that "Without the European 
Commission, the Community could never have been 
constructed". I believe that the Connnission must 
retain its independence and its influence in both 
Parliament and Council. The central purpose of the 
Commission is to act as an intellectual power-house 
national, interest. We have to tackle the problems 
of the moment as well as seeking to map out the 
way ahead. 
The European Monetary System, which grew out 
of an initiative by Roy Jenkins on behalf of the 
Conmtlssion as a whole, is a good example of the 
combination of technical expertise and political 
direction which is required of the Commission. It 
is, I believe, one of the major monuments of this 
Connnission. 
The next big test for the Commission (and indeed 
for the Community) is the restructuring of the Community 
Budget. The mandate given to the Commission by the 
Council after the agreement on how to deal with the 
British budget problem requires from us a fundamental 
analysis of the Communities finances and policies, 
an analysis which asks the questions, poses the 
options and points the way ahead. I hope our report, 
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which must be completed by June 30 1981, will provide 
the basis on which the Connnunity can create a budgetary 
system to meet the challenges of the 1980s and beyond. 
It must prevent the recurrence of unacceptable situations 
for any Member State and enable the Comm.unity. to 
undertake a wider range of common policies in order 
to contribute to the strengthening of Europe as a whole. 
!he credibility of the Connnission and the usefulness 
of the exercise deoend on us takin2 a brave and 
independent approach. 
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